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Abstract. Inflight loss of control (LOC-I) is a significant cause of General Aviation (GA) fixed-wing aircraft accidents. The 
United States National Transportation Safety Board’s database provides a rich source of accident data, but conventional 
analyses of the database yield limited insights to LOC-I. We investigate the causes of 5,726 LOC-I fixed-wing GA aircraft 
accidents in the United States in 1999–2008 and 2009–2017 using a state-based modeling approach. The multi-year analy-
sis helps discern changes in causation trends over the last two decades. Our analysis highlights LOC-I causes such as pi-
lot actions and mechanical issues that were not discernible in previous research efforts. The logic rules in the state-based 
approach help infer missing information from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident reports. We 
inferred that 4.84% (1999–2008) and 7.46% (2009–2017) of LOC-I accidents involved a preflight hazardous aircraft condi-
tion. We also inferred that 20.11% (1999–2008) and 19.59% (2009–2017) of LOC-I accidents happened because the aircraft 
hit an object or terrain. By removing redundant coding and identifying when codes are missing, the state-based approach 
potentially provides a more consistent way of coding accidents compared to the current coding system.
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Introduction
Fixed-wing General Aviation (GA) accidents comprise 
approximately 64% of all aviation accidents in the United 
States (U.S.) every year (NTSB, 2019a). Most fixed-wing 
GA accidents result from inflight loss of control (LOC-
I), controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), continued visual 
flight rules flight into instrumental meteorological condi-
tions (‘continued VFR into IMC’), engine failures, and 
fuel exhaustion/contamination (cf. AOPA, 2018; GAJSC, 
2016). In particular, inflight loss of control (LOC-I) con-
tinues to be a significant cause of GA fixed-wing aircraft 
accidents each year. Loss of control is “a hazardous condi-
tion that involves an unintended departure of an aircraft 
from controlled flight regime” (FAA, 2019). Nearly 50% 
of fixed-wing GA accidents in the last two decades in 
the United States (U.S.) are attributed to LOC-I (NTSB, 
2019a). In 2017, 21% of fixed-wing GA accidents overall 
involved LOC-I; for fatal accidents, this percentage in-
creases to 57%.
There is a clear need to better understand the reasons 
for LOC-I accidents. One approach to improving our un-
derstanding is by analyzing historical accident reports. In 
the U.S., the National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB] 
investigates all civil aviation accidents. After concluding 
their investigation, the NTSB publishes a final report, 
which includes a prose section with summary analysis 
of the accident, a discussion of the probable cause and 
findings, and “factual information” on the flight history, 
personnel, aircraft, meteorological conditions, medical 
and pathological information, and any tests and research 
the investigators conducted (NTSB, 2019b). Each acci-
dent is also coded using a set of codes for occurrences, 
findings, and phases of flight to facilitate trend analysis 
(NTSB, 1998). Rao et al. (2016) provides a detailed discus-
sion of this system. The NTSB coding system is based on 
an event-based model, where one event leads to another, 
but not all aspects of accidents are events. For example, an 
impaired pilot is better understood as a continuing condi-
tion, or a state (Rao & Marais, 2020). The pilot’s impaired 
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condition makes subsequent errors more likely, and there-
fore does not fit well as “only” an initiating event. Addi-
tionally, multiple codes in the NTSB database have similar 
meanings. For example, the subject codes 24518: Altitude 
and 24519: Proper altitude both indicate that the pilot 
did not maintain the correct altitude. Such redundancy 
in codes can lead to inaccurate counts in accident causes. 
Finally, the NTSB database does not present all findings as 
codes, for example, in the pre-2008 coding system, there 
are no codes to capture improper aircraft heading.
Unfortunately, the prose content for GA accidents tends 
to be short. In 2017 (the most recent year to have completed 
factual reports), the average length for the 105 accidents 
that had LOC-I codes was just 449 words. The occurrence 
chains (number of occurrence codes) for these 105 acci-
dents are also short (mean chain length = 3.36, SD = 1.42), 
albeit somewhat longer than that for all GA fixed-wing 
aircraft accidents (mean chain length = 2.48, SD = 1.60). 
145 accidents had only a single recorded occurrence. The 
longest chain was 8 (for one LOC-I accident; NTSB ID: 
GAA17CA303). 80% of these reports included a code re-
lated to crashing into terrain/water. Thus, the potentially 
wide range of accident stories is reduced to a small set of 
short stories, most of which are some variation of “the pi-
lot lost control and crashed into the ground/water”. These 
problems are compounded by the lack of information about 
the cause for LOC-I. For instance, the most frequently used 
cause for fixed-wing LOC-I accidents is aircraft control not 
maintained - in other words, the pilot lost control because 
they did not maintain control (Houston et al., 2012; Franza 
& Fanjoy, 2012). So, we cannot easily determine why LOC-I 
happens, what most often causes it, or whether there have 
been any changes in its causes.
Several researchers have used NTSB codes to identify 
GA accident causes. Boyd (2015) found that failure to fol-
low single engine procedures following loss of an engine 
was the highest factor in fatal twin-engine piston aircraft 
GA accidents under visual weather conditions. Fultz and 
Ashley’s (2016) found that 60% of weather-related fatal 
accidents occurred in IMC. Bazargan and Guzhva (2007) 
found that hazardous weather and light conditions such 
as IMC and dark night conditions increased the likeli-
hood that accidents would be fatal. Goldman et al. (2002) 
found that of maintenance errors, installation errors such 
as using the wrong parts were most likely to cause injury 
or fatality. Aguiar et al. (2017) found that GA accidents in 
mountainous terrain and high elevation environments most 
commonly involved CFIT and wind gusts/shear. Other 
analyses used NTSB accident narratives. Boyd and Stolzer 
(2016) identified accident-precipitating factors and found 
that not following the checklist/flight manual contributed 
the most to fatal or serious turbine-powered GA accidents. 
Ballard et al. (2013) considered three major risk factors for 
fatalities, post-crash fires, crashes after flight in IMC, and 
off-airport crashes (in other words, away from emergency 
services), and found that fatalities were most likely to oc-
cur in accidents occurring after flight in IMC contributed 
the most to fatal air tour accidents. Wiegmann et al. (2005) 
used the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
(HFACS) to identify unsafe operator acts. 80% of the GA 
accidents were associated with at least one skill-based er-
ror such as handling. While these studies uncovered part 
of what causes GA accidents (e.g., flight into IMC is often 
involved in fatal accidents), they were not able to explain 
how, for example, IMC leads to fatal accidents.
Studies using NTSB data to understand LOC-I acci-
dents face similar challenges. Previous work attempted to 
build chains of events in accidents using occurrence codes 
in the NTSB database. Rao and Marais (2015) found that 
13.8% of 5051 GA rotorcraft fatal accidents had LOC-I 
as the first occurrence. Houston et al. (2012) found that 
75% of the 147 instructional LOC-I accident reports cited 
LOC-I as the first occurrence - thus we cannot determine 
what led to the LOC-I. Other studies investigated the im-
pact of aircraft characteristics on accidents. Franza and 
Fanjoy (2012) analyzed correlations between contributing 
factors to accidents from 2002–2012 in Cirrus SR20 and 
Piper PA28-161 aircraft. They also found that pilots’ fail-
ure to maintain directional control contributed to 50% of 
fatal accidents in both aircraft models. Ud-Din and Yoon 
(2018) found that poor health and impairment due to 
medication, followed by poor manual control and inad-
equate pilot adherence to flight procedures were the most 
significant events for LOC during maneuvering.
One way to improve understanding is by modeling 
accidents. Several researchers have used Bayesian net-
works to identify causal factors and assess risk (Ancel & 
Shih, 2012; Ancel et al., 2015; Ayra et al., 2019; Xiao et al., 
2020; Uğurlu et al., 2020). Ancel et al. (2015) developed 
an object-oriented Bayesian network (OOBN), based on 
HFACS, to model Part 121 and 135 LOC-I accidents. 
They identified organizational deficiencies as underlying 
flight-related and maintenance crew-related airline acci-
dents. Bayesian networks are useful to visually represent a 
summary analysis of accidents. But they require detailed 
information that is often not available for GA accidents. 
The probability calculation for each node in a Bayesian 
network requires expert judgment and information from 
sources such as operators and aviation agencies. Further, 
some accident sequences have cyclic relationships, e.g., an 
aircraft stall may cause an LOC-I and vice versa. Since 
Bayesian networks are directed acyclic graphs, they cannot 
capture such cyclic relationships between aircraft states.
We investigate whether additional insight into fixed-
wing LOC-I can be garnered from the NTSB database 
by taking a different modelling approach. We extend the 
state-based approach developed for rotorcraft accidents by 
Rao and Marais (2020) to fixed-wing aircraft accidents. 
Section 1 presents the state-based approach and devel-
ops a vocabulary of 108 state and 226 trigger definitions, 
along with a set of grammar rules for connecting states 
and triggers. We show how these rules can be used to 
logically infer some missing states and triggers. In Sec-
tion 2, we identify and analyze GA LOC-I accidents us-
ing the approach and identify an additional 1,214 LOC-I 
accidents that were not directly identifiable using LOC-I 
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NTSB codes. Using the state-based approach, we found 
additional causes and diff erent cause rankings for LOC-I 
accidents than those resulting from conventional analyses, 
such as those described earlier.
1. A state-based approach for fi xed-wing aircraft  
accidents
Rao and Marais (2020) developed a state-based approach 
for modelling helicopter accidents by representing acci-
dents as a sequence of states and triggers, rather than the 
event-centric current coding system. Th e state and trigger 
defi nitions are based on codes in the NTSB database that 
have been used for rotorcraft  accidents (occurrence codes, 
fi nding codes, modifi er codes, and phase of fl ight codes). 
In this section, we extend the state-based model to fi xed-
wing aircraft  accidents.
1.1. State-based model introduction
Th e state-based model consists of two core concepts: 
accidents are modelled as a series of states and triggers; 
and, states and triggers (the dictionary) are ordered and 
linked by rules (the grammar), as shown in Figure 1.
Th e system comprises the aircraft  and pilot(s) operat-
ing the aircraft . A state is a segment of time wherein a 
system exhibits a particular behavior. Th e nodes in Figure 
1 represent states of a notional system where the fi rst state 
represents the default or start state of the system and the 
last (end) state represents the system’s behavior in the fi nal 
segment of time in the accident. A system can be in only 
one state at any given point of time. Th ere are two types of 
states: nominal and hazardous. A nominal state is a state 
of a system that is generally accepted as suffi  ciently safe 
by the applicable stakeholders. “Suffi  ciently safe” depends 
on the particular context and stakeholders. For example, 
safe states are those where the aircraft  is operating in good 
weather with all systems functioning and with a compe-
tent and fi t-to-fl y pilot. A system is in a nominal state only 
when both the pilot and aircraft  are in nominal states. A 
nominal state cannot lead directly to an accident state - it 
must be directly preceded by a hazardous state.
A hazardous state is an off -nominal state that may 
lead to an accident or an incident. For example, a pilot’s 
poor physiological condition is a “pilot hazardous state”, 
and loss of engine power is an “aircraft  hazardous state”. 
A system is in a hazardous state if either the pilot(s), the 
aircraft , or both the pilot(s) and aircraft  are in hazard-
ous states, as shown in Figure 2. We categorize hazardous 
states based on when they occur in an accident sequence. 
A prefl ight hazardous state is a hazardous state that exists 
before a fl ight starts, for example, prefl ight mechanical is-
sue. An intermediary hazardous state occurs between a 
prefl ight state and an end state (in this case, an accident), 
for example, infl ight loss of control. Each fl ight terminates 
in an end state, which can be nominal (e.g., safe landing), 
an incident (e.g., bounced landing), or an accident (e.g., 
midair collision).
A trigger is an event that occurs at a precise instant of 
time, causing either the aircraft , pilot(s), or both the air-
craft  and pilot(s) to transition between states or remain in 
the same state. For example, failure of an engine can cause 
a system to transition from a nominal state to a hazardous 
state. Th e links connecting to each state in Figure 1 repre-
sent triggers to each state. Th e initiating trigger, points to 
the default or start state of the system.
1.2. Fixed-wing aircraft  dictionary of hazardous 
states, triggers, and additional information
Th e existing rotorcraft  data dictionary has 84 state defi ni-
tions and 182 trigger defi nitions. Here, we extend the data 
dictionary to fi xed-wing aircraft  accidents.
1.2.1. Fixed-wing state defi nitions
Building on the existing rotorcraft  dictionary and using 
the NTSB database, we amended states and created new 
states, resulting in a set of 108 states that are applicable to 
fi xed-wing aircraft , as shown in Table 1.
Fixed-wing aircraft  diff er from rotorcraft  in four ways 
relevant to accident modelling: (1) Maneuvering. Rotor-
craft  and fi xed-wing aircraft  have diff erent maneuvering 
capabilities due to diff erent fl ight mechanics. For example, 
rotorcraft , unlike fi xed-wing aircraft , can perform maneu-
vers such as hovering, and can autorotate in the event of 
losing engine power. So, these rotorcraft  states are not 
applicable to fi xed-wing aircraft . (2)  Control surfaces. 
Fixed-wing aircraft , unlike rotorcraft , have ailerons, a rud-
der, and an elevator for aerodynamic stability. For example, 
fi xed wing aircraft  have fl aps, unlike rotorcraft . Th erefore, 
we created a new state for improper fl aps extended speed 
(VFE). (3) Takeoff  and landing characteristics. Advanced Figure 1. State-based representation of a notional system
 a) b) c)
Figure 2. Illustration of three possible scenarios where a system 
is in hazardous state. Examples of these states are: (a) pilot’s 
poor physiological condition; (b) loss of engine power; 
(c) pilot’s poor physiological condition during a loss of engine 
power (adapted from Rao & Marais, 2020)
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rotorcraft with wheels that can perform running takeoffs, 
hover taxi, and air taxi, are relatively rare in civil aviation, 
and therefore rotorcraft accidents associated with these 
maneuvers are also rare (there were no such accidents in 
the 34 years covered in Rao and Marais’ 2020 analysis). 
We therefore created new fixed-wing states such as im-
proper takeoff, improper taxi speed, water loop/swerve, 
and aircraft hydroplaning. (4)  Airspeed factors. Fixed-
wing aircraft have additional airspeeds to rotorcraft. For 
example, fixed-wing aircraft have five different airspeeds 
that convey takeoff or rotation speed: lift-off speed (VLOF), 
takeoff safety speed (V2), minimum takeoff speed (V2MIN), 
rotation speed (VR), and maximum speed from which the 
airplane can stop within the accelerate-stop distance (V1). 
We define a new improper takeoff/rotation speed state, as 
shown in Table 2. Table 2 also shows the Boolean logic for 
the improper takeoff or rotation speed state, which serves 
as input to our translation code. Similarly, we created 10 
additional airspeed states for fixed-wing aircraft such as 
improper landing gear operating/ extended speed (VLO 
and VLE) and improper flaps extended speed (VFE).
Finally, we added several states that may also apply to 
rotorcraft but did not appear in any of the rotorcraft acci-
dents in the database. For example, Rao and Marais (2020) 
defined two LOC states for rotorcraft: inflight loss of con-
trol (LOC-I) and on-ground loss of control (LOC-G). 
Because the database does not always specify whether 
the LOC was inflight or on the ground, we created an 
unknown phase LOC state (LOC-U). Table 3 shows the 
definition and coding for the LOC-I state.





States applicable only to rotorcraft 13 N/A Improper autorotation only occurs in rotorcraft.
Rotorcraft states applicable to both 
rotorcraft and fixed-wing aircraft
54 Both rotorcraft and fixed-wing aircraft can experience hard 
landings.
Rotorcraft states re-coded for 
fixed-wing aircraft
17 Fixed-wing aircraft have additional airspeed types, compared 
to rotorcraft such as minimum takeoff speed (V2MIN).
New states defined for fixed-wing 
aircraft only
N/A 37 Rotorcraft do not have flaps, unlike fixed-wing aircraft, so 
we created improper flaps extended speed (VFE) state for 
fixed-wing aircraft.
Total states 84 108
Table 2. Improper takeoff or rotation speed state definition for fixed-wing aircraft
NTSB Codes (Pre-2008) Description
24507 AND (3101 OR 3104 OR 3107 OR 
3108 OR 3109 OR 3112 OR 3115 OR 3120 
OR 3122 OR 3127 OR 3129 OR 3138)
Airspeed, lift off speed (VLOF) AND (“Below” OR “Delayed” OR “Exceeded” OR 
“Excessive” OR “Improper” OR “Inattentive” OR “Inadequate” OR “Misjudged” OR 
“Not attained” OR “Not maintained” OR “Not obtained” OR “Reduced”)
24568 AND (3000 OR 3011 OR 3107 OR 
3127 OR 3129)
Airspeed, maximum speed from which the airplane can stop within the accelerate-
stop distance (V1) AND (“Above” OR “Not obtained/maintained” OR “Exceeded” 
OR “Not obtained” OR “Not maintained”)
24569 AND (3122 OR 3127) Airspeed, takeoff safety speed (V2) AND (“Not attained” OR “Not maintained”)
24570 AND (3011 OR 3115 OR 3122) Airspeed, minimum takeoff safety speed (V2min) AND (“Not obtained/maintained” 
OR “Inadequate” OR “Not attained”)
Table 3. Inflight loss of control (LOC-I) state definition for fixed-wing aircraft
NTSB Codes (Pre-2008) Description
250 Loss of control - in flight
110 Altitude deviation, uncontrolled
553 Descent - uncontrolled phase
24524 AND (3140) Descent AND (“Uncontrolled”)
24525 AND (3140) Proper descent rate AND (“Uncontrolled”)
NTSB Codes (Post-2008) Description
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1.2.2. Fixed-wing trigger definitions
Using the NTSB codes used for fixed-wing aircraft acci-
dents, and combining codes that convey the same mean-
ing, we defined 226 triggers (Table  4). Similar to haz-
ardous states, we accounted for the differences between 
helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft when augmenting and 
creating new triggers for fixed-wing aircraft. For example, 
based on different speed characteristics of fixed-wing air-
craft, we re-coded the rotorcraft trigger improper aborted 
landing/takeoff for fixed-wing aircraft by adding a subject 
code 24503 Abort above V1 with its modifiers. V1 is the 
takeoff decision speed, beyond which a flight can continue 
to take off even in case of an engine failure.
1.2.3. Additional information
Rao (2016) used information codes to translate NTSB 
codes that provide additional information about the pre-
vailing conditions during an accident, but do not translate 
to states or triggers. Here, we amend this definition by 
adding a fourth category, pre-existing condition (PEC), 
and redefining the information codes to exclude PECs.
Pre-existing Condition (PEC): A condition in the 
aircraft’s environment that remains true or applicable 
throughout a flight and is neither a state nor a trigger is 
defined as a pre-existing condition. We define three pre-
existing conditions: unsuitable airport facilities, unsuit-
able runway, and unsuitable physical environment. For 
example, unsuitable runway PEC gives information about 
a runway condition but does not describe a state or a trig-
ger in an accident (Table 5).
Information code: Detail about a system that is neither 
a state, a trigger, nor a pre-existing condition, is defined 
as an information code. Information codes describe ter-
rain/object(s) that an aircraft collided with and phases of 
flight in accidents. For example, the code 03022020: tree 
indicates that an aircraft collided with a tree during the 
accident.
In the pre-2008 system, the NTSB uses subject codes 
19200: terrain condition or 20200: object with modifiers 
to describe the type of terrain or objects. In the post-2008 
system, the NTSB uses different finding codes to describe 
the type of terrain or objects with modifiers such as 91: 
contributed to outcome. Additionally, the NTSB uses 
a separate set of codes to describe phases of flight with 
each occurrence in accidents. Therefore, we defined three 
information code categories: information about objects, 
information about terrain, and information about phases 
of flight.
1.3. Illustrative example
We demonstrate the working of fixed-wing state and trig-
ger definitions and the grammar rules using an accident 
(NTSB ID: ERA13FA059) that happened in November 
2012 in Owls Head, Maine involving a Cessna 172N. 





Triggers applicable only to rotorcraft 43 N/A Rotor system failure can occur only in rotorcraft.
Rotorcraft triggers applicable to both 
rotorcraft and fixed-wing aircraft
76 Both fixed-wing and rotorcraft can experience improper 
engine shutdown.
Rotorcraft triggers re-coded for fixed-
wing aircraft
63 Both rotorcraft and fixed-wing aircraft can experience 
improper aborted landing/takeoff, but there are 
additional NTSB codes that apply for fixed-wing aircraft.
New triggers defined for fixed-wing 
aircraft
N/A 87 Rotorcraft have rotors and not propellers, so they do not 
have a propeller control failure trigger.
Total triggers 182 226
Table 5. Unsuitable runway pre-existing condition
NTSB Codes (Pre-2008) Description
19201 Runway/landing area condition
NTSB Codes (Post-2008) Description
03023000 Runway/land/takeoff/taxi surface - (general)
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During the departure roll, the aircraft  collided with a 
ground vehicle that was crossing the runway, breaking the 
right elevator. Th e pilot continued taking off , stalled the 
aircraft , and went into a low-altitude spin before hitting 
the ground. Th e fi rst two columns of Table  6 show the 
resulting NTSB codes for the accident report.
We model the accident in fi ve steps:
1. Identify states and triggers from the accident 
data: We map the fi nding codes and occurrence 
codes from the database with corresponding states 
and triggers as shown in Table  6. Figure 3 shows 
the states and triggers. Since there are no codes in-
dicating that the pilot was impaired or the aircraft  
was functioning improperly, we indicate their state 
as nominal.
2. Identify prefl ight, intermediary, and end states: 
Next, we identify the prefl ight, intermediary and 
end states, as shown in the last column of Table 6.
3. Sequence hazardous states: We apply the grammar 
rules to sequence hazardous states. Th e sequencing 
rules are based on fl ight physics and the sequence 
that the NTSB used to report accidents. See Rao and 
Marais (2020) for a detailed discussion of grammar 
rules. Figure 3 shows the accident model aft er ap-
plying the sequencing rules.
4. Link states and triggers: Using the grammar rules, 
we link triggers to the sequenced states, as shown in 
Figure 3. Th ree states do not have entering triggers, 
because the accident report does not mention any 
applicable trigger related codes.
5. Infer triggers and states based on grammar rules: 
Th e NTSB codes for an accident may not be suf-
fi cient to identify all states and triggers in that ac-
cident, as shown by the three missing triggers in 
Figure 3. We use the state-and-trigger sequencing 
rules to infer some of the missing information.
Consider for example the trigger recovery action not 
possible aft er loss of control. We infer this trigger when-
ever an end state succeeds a loss of control state in an 
accident, and the accident does not include any codes re-
lated to an improper remedial action or a lack of action 
triggers (Loss of control state AND (end state) AND NOT 
(“Improper remedial action” trigger OR “Lack of action” 
trigger).
2. Analysis of infl ight loss of control accidents
Th is section compares conventional and state-based sta-
tistical analyses of LOC-I accidents involving fi xed-wing 
aircraft  operating under 14CFR  Part  91 that occurred 
from 1999–2017 and are recorded in the NTSB database. 
Because the NTSB coding system changed in 2008, we 
consider two diff erent time frames: 1999–2008 and 2009–
2017.
Table 6. NTSB Codes and Corresponding States or Triggers (NTSB ID: ERA13FA059)
Finding code/ Occurrence 
code Modifi er/Person/Phase Code Resulting State/Trigger
Prefl ight/intermediary/
end state
2041015: Incorrect action 
performance
44: Pilot Improper action performance trigger N/A
1062022: Pitch control 20: Not attained/maintained Infl ight loss of control state Intermediary
2041030: Lack of action 48: Airport personnel Lack of action trigger N/A
3036000: Light condition 91: Contributed to outcome Prevailing weather and light state Prefl ight
320: Runway incursion 300: Takeoff Runway incursion state Intermediary
490: Collision during takeoff /
landing
300: Takeoff Collision during takeoff /landing state Intermediary
240: Loss of control in-fl ight 350: Initial Climb Infl ight loss of control state Intermediary
470: Collision with terrain/
object (non-CFIT)
650: Uncontrolled descent Infl ight collision with terrain/object state End
Figure 3. State-based representation of the accident. 
Note: Using the grammar rules, we infer triggers to the sequenced states that have missing triggers. Th e links (and text) in blue are the 
inferred triggers. Th e text in red shows a missing trigger that cannot be inferred using the grammar rules.
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2.1. Conventional analysis of LOC-I accidents
Conventional analyses such as those discussed in the in-
troduction, analyse the relative frequencies with which 
NTSB codes are cited in accident reports. Here we do such 
an analysis for LOC-I accidents. In the pre-2008 coding 
system, LOC-I accidents are indicated by 250: Loss of con-
trol – in flight; in the post-2008 system, by 240: Loss of con-
trol – in flight. The NTSB uses subject code and modifier 
combinations (and finding codes in the post-2008 system) 
to provide greater detail about the level of contribution 
each finding had to the outcome. Each combination is des-
ignated as a cause or contributing factor. We identified the 
subject code and modifier combinations that the NTSB 
designated as causes (denoted as jCause ) and calculated 
the presence for each subject code and modifier combina-
tion as the number of times it was used at least once in 
an accident, normalized by the total number of accidents 

















We use the same method to calculate the presence of 
contributing factors in accidents. In this section, we dis-
cuss the most frequent (top) causes and contributing fac-
tors in LOC-I accidents. Table 7 shows the top ten causes 
for LOC-I accidents in 1999–2008. The highest cause of 
LOC-I is that the pilot did not maintain aircraft control 
(24566–3127: Aircraft control - not maintained), thus 
providing no indication of what caused the loss of control. 
Failure to maintain airspeed (24506–3127: Airspeed - not 
maintained) has the second highest presence, providing at 
least some suggestion that airspeed is an important factor 
in LOC-I accidents. This finding is corroborated by the 
other top-ten causes related to airspeed in our analysis.
Table 8 shows the top ten causes for LOC-I accidents 
in 2009–2017. Three of the top four causes of LOC-I, air-
craft control - pilot, directional control - not attained/
maintained, and performance/control parameters - not at-
tained/maintained, are variations of “loss of control”. Only 
the second highest cause, airspeed - not attained/main-
tained provides some indication of what happened during 
the LOC-I accident. Some of the top causes in 2009–2017 
were different from the 1999–2008 findings. In 2009–2017, 
we found more causes related to aircraft performance (per-
formance/control parameters - not attained/ maintained) 
and pilot actions (decision making/ judgment - pilot, in-
correct action performance - pilot, and angle of attack - 
not attained/maintained). This difference arises from two 
main reasons: (1) the NTSB codes and their descriptions 
changed in 2008 (the NTSB built an entirely new coding 
system); and (2) the NTSB started using some code de-
scriptions more extensively as causes in post-2008 LOC-I 
accidents compared to the pre-2008 accidents. For exam-
ple, the NTSB used aircraft performance related finding as 
a cause more in the post-2008 system (1062000-20: Per-
formance/control parameters - not attained/maintained) 
than in the pre-2008 system (17300: Aircraft performance).
The pre-2008 coding system has four separate subject 
codes to indicate decision making or judgment (24000: 
Planning/decision, 24010: Inflight planning/decision, 
24031: Improper decision, and 60000: Judgment) as com-
pared to only one finding code in the post-2008 system 
(02041520: Decision making/judgment). Out of these four 
subject code and modifier combinations in the pre-2008 
system, 24010-3109: Improper inflight planning/decision 
appears the most frequently (2.15%) in 1999–2008 (cited 
as 12th most frequent cause in LOC-I accidents). The NTSB 
used decision making/judgment more frequently as a cause 
in the post-2008 LOC-I accidents than in the pre-2008 acci-
dents (presence of 11.29%). Unlike in the post-2008 system, 
there are no codes in the pre-2008 system that indicate in-
correct action by pilot or angle of attack and therefore these 
are some new causes that we identified in 2009–2017. Some 
of the top causes from 1999–2008 such as stall - inadvertent 
and stall/spin - inadvertent were not identifiable in 2009–
2017 because the post-2008 coding system does not use any 
stall- or spin-related finding codes as causes. However, the 
post-2008 system uses 241: Aerodynamic stall/spin as an 
occurrence code in 16.79% of LOC-I accidents.
Table 7. Top ten causes for LOC-I accidents in 1999–2008
Subject code with modifier Description Presence, %
24566–3127 Aircraft control - Not maintained 27.43
24506–3127 Airspeed - Not maintained 21.97
24551–3113 Stall - Inadvertent 7.68
24511–3127 Airspeed, stall (Vs) - Not maintained 5.78
25000–3001 Reason for occurrence undetermined - No Modifier 5.60
24539–3127 Directional control - Not maintained 5.20
24026–3115 Compensation for wind conditions - Inadequate 4.22
24552–3113 Stall/spin - Inadvertent 3.93
33400–0 Spatial disorientation - No Modifier 3.49
24506–3115 Airspeed - Inadequate 2.84
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Table 9 shows the top contributing factors to LOC-I 
accidents in 1999–2008. From 1999–2008, weather and 
light conditions, collision with objects, and low altitude 
were the top contributing factors in LOC-I accidents. Ad-
verse weather conditions appear in 33.25% of LOC-I ac-
cidents, out of which wind gust (6.37%) and crosswind 
(4.69%) are the most dangerous weather conditions for 
LOC-I. Further, 6.11% of LOC-I accidents involved col-
lision with an object, out of which collision with tree(s) 
was the most frequent.
Table  10 shows the top ten contributing factors in 
LOC-I accidents from 2009–2017. In contrast to the pre-
2008 results, terrain, object, or weather-related codes do not 
appear in the top ten factors. This difference in top causes 
is because the NTSB has tended to designate weather and 
object related finding code-modifier combinations as causes 
rather than factors in the post-2008 system. In the post-
2008 coding system, the NTSB used pilot-related codes 
more as factors which give more information about pilot’s 
decision making, actions, physical wellness, and experience.
Table 8. Top ten causes for LOC-I accidents in 2009–2017
Finding code Description Presence, %
206304044 Aircraft control – Pilot 59.39
106201020 Airspeed – Not attained/maintained 21.10
106200020 Performance/control parameters – Not attained/ maintained 18.43
106202020 Directional control – Not attained/maintained 11.68
204152044 Decision making/judgment – Pilot 11.29
500000000 Not determined – No Modifier 7.03
202202544 Spatial disorientation – Pilot 6.41
106204220 Angle of attack – Not attained/maintained 5.90
204101544 Incorrect action performance – Pilot 5.62
206304046 Aircraft control – Student pilot 4.59
Table 9. Top ten contributing factors for LOC-I accidents in 1999–2008
Subject code with modifier Description Presence, %
20000–2207 Weather condition – Gusts 6.37
20000–2203 Weather condition – Crosswind 4.69
20200–2517 Object – Tree(s) 3.20
24518–3004 Altitude – Low 3.02
20000–2214 Weather condition – Low ceiling 2.91
20000–2212 Weather condition – High density altitude 2.58
20100–2305 Light condition – Dark night 2.55
20000–2204 Weather condition – Clouds 2.44
20000–2222 Weather condition – Tailwind 2.36
24551–3113 Stall – Inadvertent 1.89
Table 10. Top ten contributing factors for LOC-I accidents in 2009–2017
Finding Code Description Presence, %
204152044 Decision making/judgment – Pilot 4.08
203102544 Total experience with equipment – Pilot 1.87
206304044 Aircraft control – Pilot 1.08
206301544 Use of equipment/system – Pilot 0.96
201202544 Prescription medication – Pilot 0.91
500000000 Not determined – No Modifier 0.79
206151044 Preflight inspection – Pilot 0.74
201202044 Illicit drug – Pilot 0.68
204102540 Delayed action – Instructor/check pilot 0.68
201203044 OTC medication – Pilot 0.62
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2.2. State-based analysis of LOC-I accidents
Th is section presents the top hazardous states and triggers 
using the state-based approach and compares our fi ndings 
to the conventional analysis. We identifi ed LOC-I acci-
dents in 1999–2017 using the data dictionary to map the 
NTSB codes to the LOC-I state defi nition. Our conven-
tional analysis identifi ed 4,512 LOC-I accidents in 1999–
2017. By mapping the NTSB codes to the LOC-I state, we 
found 1,214 additional LOC-I accidents, as shown by year 
in Figure 4.
We calculated the presence of hazardous states and 
triggers in the LOC-I accidents using Equation (1). Figure 
5 compares the top hazardous states for LOC-I accidents 
in 1999–2008 and 2009–2017, ranked based on the top 
hazardous states for the recent years (2009–2017). Figure 
5 shows that in 2009–2017, most (77.8%) of the LOC-I 
accidents typically ended with an infl ight collision with 
terrain/water/object.
Th e state-based analysis helped in identifying some 
new fi ndings that could not be identifi ed from a conven-
tional analysis, such as abnormal runway contact and ex-
ceeding aircraft  performance limits. As shown in Figure 
5, we identifi ed abnormal runway contact state only in 
2009–2017 accidents because the NTSB’s pre-2008 coding 
system does not have any codes to describe abnormal con-
tact of the aircraft  with the runway. Similarly, the pre-2008 
system contains only one code that indicates exceeding 
aircraft  performance limits (17300: Aircraft  performance), 
as compared to three diff erent codes in the post-2008 sys-
tem. Th e NTSB did not use the pre-2008 subject code 
(17300) extensively in the 1999–2008 accidents and it 
therefore has a presence of only 0.28%. We identifi ed new 
fi ndings such as prefl ight mechanical issue and insuffi  cient 
qualifi cation/training as important causes for LOC-I, with 
a presence of 8.13% and 10.15% respectively in 2009–2017 
accidents. Prefl ight mechanical issue involves scenarios 
such as improper weight and balance calculations by pilot 
and operating an aircraft  with known defi ciencies. Insuf-
fi cient qualifi cation/training includes lack of experience in 
a type of aircraft , night or instrument fl ying, inadequate 
fl ight training, and the pilot not being current in their 
certifi cation.
Weather factors such as prevailing/existing weather 
and light conditions (31.72% in 2009–2017 and 32.88% in 
1999–2008) and fl ight through poor weather (12.38% in 
2009–2017 and 10.73% in 1999–2008) play a major role 
in LOC-I accidents. Although the number of prevailing 
weather-related codes increased from just two codes to 47 
in the new NTSB coding system, the number of times that 
the NTSB cited codes describing “prevailing weather/light 
conditions” or “fl ying through a poor weather” in LOC-I 
accidents remains similar.
Aircraft  stall/spin appears in only 22.3% of LOC-I 
accidents in 2009–2017 as compared to the high pres-
ence (41.72%) in pre-2008 LOC-I accidents because the 
pre-2008 coding system has two stall/spin related fi nding 
codes whereas the post-2008 coding system has only one 
stall related occurrence code, but no fi nding codes.
Further, pilot in a disoriented/lacking awareness state 
(not shown in Figure 5) was present in 6.42% of 2009–
2017 accidents. Th is state involves situations when a pi-
lot loses a reference point especially when fl ying through 
poor weather (for example, low visibility and instrumental 
meteorological conditions).
Figure 6 shows the top ten triggers in LOC-I acci-
dents. Additional fi ndings into LOC-I accidents such as 
improper infl ight planning/decision-making, improper 
maintenance, improper prefl ight planning, and improp-
er use of procedure or directives could not be identifi ed 
from a conventional analysis of the NTSB database. In 
2009–2017, improper infl ight planning/decision-making 
has the highest presence (17.34%) in LOC-I accidents. 
Th is trigger involves scenarios such as reduced/improper 
judgement or decision-making by pilot, and not recog-
nizing or comprehending risks. Improper maintenance 
and prefl ight planning put the fl ight in a hazardous state 
Figure 4. Comparison of number of LOC-I accidents found 
using the NTSB codes vs. state defi nitions
Figure 5. Comparison of presence of top hazardous states for 
LOC-I accidents in 1999–2008 and 2009–2017
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(such as an unsafe to fl y aircraft  or severe weather condi-
tions) even before it starts. Some of the top triggers such 
as delayed action, lack of action, improper action perfor-
mance, and improper angle of attack were only cited in 
the NTSB’s post-2008 coding system, since the pre-2008 
coding system does not use any relevant codes to describe 
such pilot actions. Th e trigger Undetermined reason, al-
though used extensively (8.87% in 1999–2008 and 9.50% 
in 2009–2017), does not provide any useful information 
about how LOC-I happened.
Next, we use the state-based approach to identify omis-
sions in accident coding and infer the missing informa-
tion using the grammar rules. Figure 7 shows the inferred 
hazardous states. 4.84% and 7.46% of LOC-I accidents in 
1999–2008 and 2009–2017 respectively did not cite any 
codes related to aircraft  prefl ight hazardous state (such as 
prefl ight mechanical issue state and prefl ight low engine 
fl uids states). We inferred this state by using other trigger 
codes that implied that the aircraft  was in a hazardous 
state before starting the fl ight. Similarly, we inferred pre-
fl ight pilot hazardous state in 1.23% and 0.20% of LOC-I 
accidents in 1999–2008 and 2009–2017 respectively. Fig-
ure 8 shows the inferred hazardous triggers. 94.87% of the 
LOC-I accidents had no corresponding codes to describe 
how an LOC-I state leads to an accident. Using our logic 
rules, we inferred the trigger recovery action not possible 
from loss of control which represents the missing data in 
the accidents.
While the NTSB reports terminating occurrences (or 
end states in this paper) that immediately followed the 
LOC-I state, the accident codes do not indicate what trig-
gers the aircraft  to transition from the LOC-I state to the 
end state. In some cases, the NTSB codes translate to trig-
gers that described how an LOC-I state transitioned to an 
accident such as improper remedial action (which is used 
in 5.14% of LOC-I accidents) and lack of action (presence 
of 4.13%).
In 19.59% of LOC-I accidents, aircraft  clipped (hit) 
terrain or object and continued the fl ight, suggesting that 
the aircraft  did not crash and collided with the object or 
terrain, thus inferring clipping of object/terrain trigger. 
In 3.29% of LOC-I accidents, the NTSB database did not 
describe how an aircraft  transitioned from system failure 
to LOC-I state. We infer impossible/reduced authority af-
ter system failure state trigger for such accidents, where 
no other related trigger codes were used. We inferred the 
trigger no/failed recovery from disoriented state (6.29% in 
2009–2017) whenever a disoriented pilot directly transi-
tioned into a loss of control state, with no related trigger 
information to describe the transition. We also inferred 
time spent in poor weather (4.79% in 2009–2017) as a 
trigger to pilot’s disoriented state when the NTSB cites 
prevailing weather/light or a fl ight through poor weather 
as the immediate former state with no related trigger in-
formation.
Conclusions
We extended Rao and Marais’ (2020) state-based approach 
for rotorcraft  accidents to fi xed-wing aircraft  accidents by 
modifying the existing rotorcraft  state and trigger defi ni-
tions and adding a total of 130 new states, triggers, and ad-
ditional information applicable to fi xed-wing aircraft . We 
created a new category to store additional accident infor-
mation called pre-existing condition (PEC) that describes 
an aircraft ’s environment that remains true throughout a 
fl ight. We developed a new set of grammar rules to se-
quence states and link triggers to states. Th ese grammar 
rules help to logically infer some of the missing informa-
tion and provide additional insights into accidents. We 
Figure 6. Comparison of presence of top triggers for LOC-I 
accidents in 1999–2008 and 2009–2017
Figure 7. Presence of inferred states in LOC-I accidents in 
1999–2008 and 2009–2017
Figure 8. Comparison of presence of top inferred triggers in 
LOC-I accidents in 1999–2008 and 2009–2017
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investigated the usefulness of the state-based approach to 
model fixed-wing LOC-I accidents and revealed some new 
findings that were not discernible from the conventional 
analysis.
The state-based approach steps away from the chain of 
events accident modeling technique by viewing aviation 
accident as a set of hazardous states and triggers. Our ap-
proach also helps to provide a more correct count of the 
LOC-I accidents and their causes in the NTSB database 
by accounting for coding redundancies. By mapping the 
LOC-I state definition codes, we identified 1,214 addi-
tional LOC-I accidents that had not been labelled as such 
in the NTSB database.
The conventional analysis provides little information 
about LOC-I accident causation by using tautologies of 
LOC-I (such as directional control and aircraft control). 
These causes provide additional information about the 
type of LOC-I (directional or aircraft), but do not mention 
why loss of control happened. The state-based approach 
helped to provide a deeper statistical understanding of the 
LOC-I accidents in the NTSB database. We ranked the 
top hazardous states and triggers in 5,726 LOC-I accidents 
in two different timeframes 1999–2008 and 2009–2017 
to understand the causal patterns in LOC-I accidents. 
In addition to the already known causes of LOC-I such 
as prevailing weather and light conditions and improper 
airspeed from the conventional analysis, our state-based 
analysis reveals that hazardous states such as exceeding 
aircraft performance limits, insufficient qualification/
training, and preflight mechanical issues are prevalent in 
LOC-I accidents. We also found that triggers such as im-
proper inflight planning/decision-making, preflight plan-
ning, and improper use of procedures are some of the top 
causes for LOC-I.
The NTSB database sometimes omits important find-
ings codes from accidents. This approach helps infer miss-
ing codes from reports and construct logical accident se-
quences (or stories). By using the grammar rules to model 
the LOC-I accidents, we inferred that aircraft clipping 
with object or terrain caused LOC-I in 19.9% of LOC-I 
accidents in 2009–2017, a finding that was not discernible 
from the conventional analysis. Additionally, we inferred 
that 4.84% and 7.46% of the accidents in 1999–2007 and 
2009–2017 respectively had missing information about 
hazardous aircraft state before the start of the flight. These 
additional insights help to provide a better understanding 
of loss of control accidents. Further, considering these ad-
ditional insights in loss of control prevention and recovery 
training techniques may help in reducing LOC-I accidents 
and incidents in the future.
31.8% of LOC-I accidents do not record any codes 
relevant to the trigger definitions and 9.6% of LOC-I ac-
cidents do not record any codes relevant to the preflight 
state definitions. In future work, we plan to expand the 
grammar rules to potentially infer specific triggers that 
cause LOC-I and the preflight states that lead to accidents. 
Text mining offers an additional source of state and trig-
ger information. In related work, we found that the nar-
ratives sometimes contain new and detailed information 
as compared to the NTSB codes. We found this informa-
tion by “manually” reading each narrative, which is time 
consuming, tedious, and prone to subjectivity. An auto-
mated text mining approach can alleviate these issues and 
yield additional information. Augmenting our state-based 
model by including such a text mining approach can offer 
an additional source of state and trigger information to 
code and model accidents more efficiently. Having more 
data from the narratives would likely reveal new states 
and triggers. To address this aspect, we consider machine 
learning as a way to automatically identify potential haz-
ardous states, triggers and new grammar rules and thus 
create a “self-developing coding system” based on the 
extracted information from the accident narratives. Fur-
ther, by investigating potential associations between pre-
existing conditions (PECs) and hazardous states, we can 
create additional rules to gain more insights from accident 
modeling. For example, the grammar rules may help to 
find the likelihood of the PEC, wet runway condition, to 
be associated with the landing to overrun state.
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